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ARTICLE
Reforming judicial recruitment and training in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia under EU guidance:
implementation without institutionalisation?
Adam Fagan a and Antoaneta Dimitrova b
aDepartment of Political Economy, King’s College London, London; bInstitute of Security and Global Aﬀairs,
Faculty of Governance and Global Aﬀairs, Leiden University, The Hague
ABSTRACT
How successful is the EU at institutionalising judicial reforms in
accession countries of the Western Balkans? Does its aid and
assistance deliver formal compliance and sustainable institutiona-
lisation of new rules and processes? Using a neo-institutionalist
approach, we assess the extent to which new EU-supported mea-
sures introduced to improve the recruitment and training of
judges and public prosecutors in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
are being implemented and institutionalised. We conclude that
whilst there is clear evidence of implementation and a widely-held
belief in both countries that judicial training and recruitment are
improving as a consequence, the institutionalization of new rules
and procedures is a far more complex process. It involves contin-
ual negotiation between diﬀerent domestic actors against
a backdrop of perpetual threats to undermine new formal rules.
Introduction
In recent years, and especially since the Bulgarian and Austrian presidencies (2018), the
EU has striven to re-generate the lost dynamism of the enlargement processes in the
Western Balkans. It has placed particular emphasis on the rule of law, which has involved
employing a range of tools, including conditionality and monitoring, to assistance and
lesson-learning. Reforming judicial recruitment and training systems, plus establishing
new judicial institutions such as high councils of the judiciary were key measures that
the EU promoted in Central and Eastern Europe during the late 1990s, but with mixed
success. The current deterioration of judicial independence in Poland and Hungary, as
well as in Bulgaria and Romania, raises questions about the eﬀectiveness of such
institutional solutions, the underlying mechanisms of the approach and the durability
of the transfer of rules and processes.
Given the importance of the rule of law as a horizontal principle supporting other key
democratic institutions, and the EU’s so-called ‘new enlargement strategy approach’ for the
Western Balkans, introduced in October 2011,1 our objective is to explore the conditions
under which already initiated reforms lead either to sustainable change in domestic
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institutions, or fail to become institutionalised and therefore have limited or no impact. In
terms of our contribution to the literature on reform under the aegis of the EU, we wish to
further an understanding of why some aspects of judicial reform take root in candidate and
new member states and lead to sustainable improvements in the functioning of the
judiciary, and others do not (Mendelski 2012, 2013; Elbasani and Šabić 2018).
We investigate whether the introduction of new rules on training and professional
recruitment has led to patchy implementation, imperfect alignment between formal and
informal rules, or actual back-sliding in two countries in the Western Balkans: Serbia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). The two countries represent an example of the region’s
reform forerunner (Serbia), and a laggard (BiH). The progress of reform in a number of
areas in Serbia remains uneven, but is still considerably greater compared to the political
and administrative deadlock which BiH has been experiencing for a long time. Tracing
the development of new judicial institutions established in both countries with the
support and at the behest of the EU, we consider why, following formal implementation,
the institutionalisation of new judicial processes continues to pose a challenge.
We start by discussing diﬀerent explanations for variation in compliance and imple-
mentation at the domestic level in countries negotiating accession with the EU, then we
introduce our analytical framework. Our focus is the interactions between new, exter-
nally introduced rules and existing rules-in-use (Dimitrova 2010; Mungiu-Pippidi 2014).
We adopt an actor driven, neo-institutionalist approach that emphasizes the signiﬁcance
of domestic formal and informal veto players and existing formal and informal rules. To
understand better the interplay between formal and informal rules, we explore the
process of implementation by means of semi-structured interviews and documentary
sources. The diﬀerent assessments of the eﬀectiveness of the reformed institutions
indicate that the new formal rules have changed the domestic opportunity structures.
Nevertheless, the incomplete or compromised use of the new rules leads to partial
eﬀects that do not signiﬁcantly improve the rule of law. Reﬂecting on the dynamics of
the two cases, we can also add some insights to the growing literature dealing with the
interactions between formal and informal rules.
EU rule implementation and reform in the Western Balkans
Scholars have ascribed the slow pace of progress in reform across the region primarily to
the weakened or (non-existent) membership perspective for these countries (Kmezić
2017; Preshova, Damjanovski, and Nechev 2017). Others have argued that the external
incentives provided by the EU cannot lead to meaningful, large scale reforms without
the access, mobilization and cooperation of an active civil society (Fagan 2010; Bobek
and Kosaš 2014). More critical analyses of the EU’s approach have argued that the
Commission has privileged judicial independence above a balancing of power and
accountability (Parau 2015). All acknowledge that given the lack of acquis shared by
existing EU member states, reforming the rule of law and judicial processes is probably
the most diﬃcult aspect of the EU’s external governance of (potential) candidate
countries in the Western Balkans (Strelkov 2016; Elbasani and Šabić 2018).
We do not contest the importance of membership negotiations, or of civil society
involvement. However, we suggest that these factors are secondary and not suﬃ-
cient to explain progress or stagnation in the institutionalization of imported rules.
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Institutionalization – understood here as the alignment of new rules and rules-in-use
– is a process which is, in our view, inﬂuenced by the competition and bargaining
among domestic actors over the shape of the new institutions. After observing
external actor supported reforms in Eastern Europe for more than two decades, it
is clear that those who contest the new rules or seek to prevent their passage into
law, will not simply give up once legislation has been passed. Considering that the
political inﬂuence and even dominance of actors willing to subvert formal rules for
personal gain has, if anything, increased throughout the region, we claim that not
only are the domestic constraints in the region more signiﬁcant than a decade ago,
but the domestic context is also in constant ﬂux. So much so, that perpetual re-
negotiation, resistance and contention continue to threaten full institutionalisation
signiﬁcantly beyond implementation (Dimitrova 2010).
We depart from an understanding of the existing gap between (new) formal
rules and rules in use (Dimitrova 2010; Mungiu-Pippidi 2014; Lauth 2012). In line
with much of the contemporary literature on the adoption of EU external rules
(Elbasani and Šabić 2018; Dimitrova 2010; Freyburg and Richter 2010), our focus is
primarily on domestic actors and their bargaining over the new rules. We aim to
contribute to the debate concerning the EU’s ability to drive forth rule change in
candidate countries via the use of a series of tools and strategies (capacity
building assistance and tutelage, conditionality, various knowledge transfer initia-
tives). The charge against all such mechanisms is that whether used in isolation or
in tandem, they fail to deliver signiﬁcant change quickly enough, or lead to non-
substantive and superﬁcial reforms that are subject to post-accession back-sliding
(Schimmelfennig 2014).
We explore the conditions under which implementation and institutionalization of
speciﬁc rules the EU has urged Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to adopt are taking
place. Our focus is on two speciﬁc institutions: the High Judicial and Prosecutorial
Council in BiH and the Judicial Academy in Serbia.2 Whilst their evolution has been
warmly supported and defended by the Commission, neither initiative can be held
up as a direct measure of conditionality. What we are exploring therefore is the
impact of EU-supported and compliant rules in a particularly contentious and diﬃcult
context, where EU compliance requirements are somewhat opaque. The EU does not
have a single model of training judges or recruiting prosecutors to ‘export’
(Mendelski 2013; Parau 2015; Preshova, Damjanovski, and Nechev 2017).
The underpinning rationale for judicial reform in the Western Balkans is that new
judicial institutions (councils and academies) will improve practice, a premise not
uncontested in the wider literature on judicial reform (Ginsburg 2010; Hayo and
Voigt 2007). The most optimistic conclusion of this literature so far is that de jure
guarantees are the most signiﬁcant determinants of independence on the benches.
Although cross-national comparative studies illustrate that countries observing
human rights protection are invariably those with de jure independence built into
constitutions and legal frameworks (Keith 2002; Hayo and Voigt 2007), studies of
post-socialist countries have found no direct relationship between de jure and de
facto independence (Smithey and Ishiyama 2002). Even in countries where rules and
practice appear to coalesce, the critical issue is sequencing: de jure independence is
shown to lag behind de facto independence (Melton and Ginsburg 2014, 188–9).
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Whilst this is not to suggest that EU measures to support de jure change in Serbia
and BiH will fail to deliver de facto independence or at least better practice, this is by
no means certain based on existing studies.
We build on Dimitrova’s (2010) approach, which deﬁnes the EU’s recommendations
as ‘imported rules’ that have to ﬁrst be formally implemented and then institutionalised.
Our focus is on the latter stage of implementation whereby domestic actors bargain
(again) over the shape of the new rules in practice. Based on the existing literature, we
anticipate that resistance to the implementation and institutionalization of the two new
bodies will occur, and will come from actors (veto players) who would prefer to restrict
access to the judiciary as an important state institution aﬀecting their possibility to
engage in rent seeking (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). We expect that the new rules
will either be institutionalized, partially implemented or subverted. We identify these
outcomes starting from Dimitrova’s (2010) approach outlining three broad scenarios
with regard to the institutionalization of adopted rules: (i) formal new rules align with
practice; (ii) new rules are ignored (decoupling or ‘empty shells’); or (iii) new rules are
openly reversed. Other recent studies from the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood have found
that under certain circumstances EU promoted rules can be (iv) deliberately subverted
so as to strengthen authoritarian regimes and institutions, leading to ‘illiberal regime
reinforcement’ (Börzel 2015; Börzel and Hüllen 2014). In such cases, the rules may well
formally remain in place and are not reversed, but are (mis)-used to reinforce ‘old’
practices. Other analyses have identiﬁed the possibility of (v) ‘partial compliance’
(Noutcheva 2009).
Taking these scenarios of rule institutionalization on board, we add rule subversion
and partial compliance (with EU requirements) to the range of potential outcomes. We
expect partial compliance to be a likely outcome, given the lengthiness of negotiations
between Brussels and the Western Balkans candidate countries and the absence of
accession pressure. We also consider the possibility of reversal to be aﬀected by the
credibility of conditionality linked to the promise of accession (Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier 2005; Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007). Analyses of reversal of EU sup-
ported rules post accession in Central and Eastern European member states support this
expectation (Meyer-Sahling 2011).
Our two case-study countries are embedded in diﬀerent contexts of enlargement
negotiations: Serbia is progressing with negotiations and is therefore in a period where
conditionality is quite eﬀective. Bosnia’s membership perspective, on the other hand, is
more symbolical than a reality, due largely to the negligible or non-existent pace of
reforms; reversal is therefore a distinct possibility. In the case of Serbia, we expect
reversal to be most likely or possible after (rather than prior to) accession. In the case
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we expect all outcomes to be possible, as the time horizon for
potential candidates is very long and thus the credibility of EU conditionality (in terms of
threats and promises) is lower than in Serbia. We expect, therefore, that decoupling
(implementing diﬀerent informal rules from the formal ones), and partial implementa-
tion or subversion would be the most likely outcomes for our two case-study countries.
Whilst we fully acknowledge that the successful implementation of new EU-inspired rules
and institutions does not on its own guarantee improvements in the quality of judicial
practice (Parau 2012, 2015; Kmezić 2017), it is still important to establish whether new, EU
promoted rules become part of existing sets of judicial rules or not. We see the
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institutionalization of adopted rules as a critical step in improving the functioning and
quality of the judicial system. Our focus is, therefore, on further exploring the conditions
under which new sets of rules or recommendations are leading to domestic institutional
change.
Method and approach
This is a comparative study using a most diﬀerent systems design to explore and identify
factors inﬂuencing similar outcomes in two diﬀerent country cases. As noted, our case
selection is inﬂuenced by the diﬀerences in reform progress vis-à-vis the accession
process on the one hand, and similarity in terms of EU pressure to undertake funda-
mental reforms with regard to the rule of law on the other. Both countries have
embarked upon bold institutional reforms appertaining to the training and selection
of judges. The results – lack of institutionalization of rules in the two relevant areas – are
also similar. The process tracing approach that we apply aims to gain further insights on
why formal and informal rules do not align into functioning institutions.
We gathered the bulk of our data from ﬁfteen semi-structured interviews with legal
actors and professionals within the state and non-state sectors in both countries, as well
as with international organisations working in the region to promote rule of law reform.
The majority of the interviews were carried out during February 2015, with a further
round of interviews in 2017 to update and clarify the gathered data.
Serbia, the EU and judicial reform
Serbia has undertaken a remarkable Europeanization journey, from a post-authoritarian
country blamed for the Yugoslav conﬂicts of the 1990s, intransigent in apprehending
and extraditing high-proﬁle war-crimes suspects, to the most recent country to com-
mence EU accession negotiations (in January 2014). At the time of writing (mid-2018),
chapters 23 and 24 are open and a track record of positive change in terms of tackling
corruption and reforming the judicial process is, according to the EU’s own assessment,
beginning to emerge (European Commission 2016b).
Using a variety of instruments and strategies (IPA, TAIEX, Twinning), the EU has
invested heavily in reforming the Serbian judiciary and building new institutions in an
attempt to change practice on the benches. Thus, although the Commission’s focus on
judicial reform in Serbia pre-dates the new approach, opening negotiations and the
emphasis on chapters 23 and 24 have intensiﬁed the external pressure since 2011. The
following section will consider the evolution and performance of the Judicial Academy,
an initiative supported by the EU.
The judicial academy in Serbia: eﬀective training, but political interference
by other means?
As is the case in other post-socialist states, the core issue in reforming judicial
independence in Serbia has been the understanding and application of the concept
of ‘independence’ amongst judicial practitioners and political actors in general.
During the Yugoslav period, any notion of independence was meaningless insofar
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as the judicial profession was an institution of the one-party state (Herron and
Randazzo 2003). Across post-communist Eastern Europe reform eﬀorts have, with
varying degrees of success, sought to separate judges from politicians as well as
improving the eﬀectiveness of the judicial process and the training of judges.
However, reforms have also made parts of the judiciary, especially general prosecu-
tors, too independent and therefore unaccountable (Bobek and Kosaš 2014; Elbasani
and Šabić 2018; Parau 2015).
Ensuring that judges are well trained, qualiﬁed and appointed according to merit, can
go a long way to improving the judicial system. Two important challenges for Serbian
reforms are: (i) ensuring meritocratic entry into the profession; and (ii) providing appro-
priate and comprehensive training for existing judges. With regard to the latter, one
diﬃculty relates to the fact that in Serbia, ‘law is usually taught by professors who have
never practiced it’ (Kmezić 2017, 114). This, according to Kmezić, reinforces an existing
gap between ‘mechanical jurisprudence’ (simply applying previous rulings) and ‘socio-
logical jurisprudence’ (a more philosophical approach based on the social eﬀects of legal
institutions, doctrines, and practices) that makes ‘harmonization with the acquis and the
application of. . .EU law. . .and unprecedented challenge’ (2017, 114).
To improve the qualiﬁcations of current and new judicial practitioners, and to ensure
meritocratic entry and progression within the profession, the EU and other international
actors recommended creating ‘The National Judicial Academy of the Republic of Serbia’.
The objective of this new training institution was to improve the performance and
legitimacy of the courts and to reform practice ‘on the benches’. The process began in
2009 with a two-year EU-funded project to create a ‘standardised System for Judiciary
Education and Training’. The aim was to upgrade the existing Judicial Centre for Training
and Professional Development – established in 2001 by the Judges’ Association of Serbia
(JAS) – as a nationwide, independent professional association3 – into a national Judicial
Academy for initial and continuing training for judicial practitioners.4 The Judicial Centre
was essentially a bottom-up initiative that in its 8 years of existence had provided judges
with resources for continual professional development. By 2009 its training provision
had been accessed by over 25,000 judges and legal practitioners.
The EU’s support for the new Judicial Academy was based on the assertion that the
existing training centre had failed to improve the quality of the judiciary – both in terms
of process eﬃciency and the quality of decisions.5 A key constraint for the Training
Centre was that it operated, sui generis, entirely outside of the legal framework, and
functioned as a professional organisation with semi-public status ‘under the patronage
of the Supreme Court’ but with no ascribed legal function or status (Kmezić 2017, 115).
Another reason for replacing it, cited by critics, was that it had failed to implement entry
training and establish permanent training for sitting judges.6
The process of upgrading the Training Centre into a national Academy has relied
heavily on EU assistance and support. Amongst certain judges and lawyers in the
country, the Academy is a positive example of internationally assisted judicial reform,
actively involving civil society in its trainings, with the potential to become a forum
where judges can openly discuss political interference and threats to their
independence.7 The EU has heavily promoted the Academy as a tool for improving
the quality of the judiciary. It has also insisted in its annual Progress Reports that ‘[t]he
means and expertise of the Judicial Academy should be increased and the legislative
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and institutional framework adapted to allow it to become the compulsory point of
entry to the judicial profession’ (European Commission 2013b, 9–10).
Compared to its predecessor, the Judicial Academy does provide far more compre-
hensive initial and continuous training. There is, for the ﬁrst time, a clear and rigorous
process of selection and entry training for magistrates and trainee judges that is
transparent and based on both a written and oral exam, plus a personality test.8 The
curriculum provides for tutelage in international legal standards as well as a strong
practical element. Admitted candidates undertake a placement as part of their training
and are closely supervised by a designated mentor throughout the 18 months of
training. Continuous training for existing judges remains voluntary, but there are clear
guidelines governing the circumstances under which the Hugh Judicial Council may
refer a sitting judge for training. Although the Judicial Academy is still not formally part
of the education system, it is now more ﬁrmly anchored within the judicial system than
its predecessor. In his evaluation of the Academy’s performance thus far, Kmezić makes
the following observation: ‘Until recently it has been unthinkable for a judge to make
a reference to the European Court for Human Rights in his or her judgement. Today, not
only is this practice common, but the decisions made by the European Court for Human
Rights are even considered by the Supreme Court for the creation of legal practices’
(2017, 118). As of mid-2017, the Academy had processed just under 10,000 participants
through its training programmes, with over 300 courses taking place each year across
the country.9
The adoption of the Law on the Judicial Academy in 2009 established its responsibility
for initial training of future judges and prosecutors as well as continuous training for
sitting judges, prosecutors, and court assistants (National Assembly of the Republic of
Serbia 2009). According to the new law, graduates of initial training were guaranteed
immediate employment and the support of the High Judicial Council (responsible for
nomination) to obtain permanent tenure in front of other candidates. This would have
quickly and decisively established the new Academy as gate-keeper to the profession and
established, within a generation, minimum standards of training and adherence to
a universal curriculum. In terms of implementation and institutionalisation, all appeared
to be on track – the new Academy was set to become the new ‘rules in use’ and, to use the
language of our analytical framework, formal new rules were aligning with informal rules.
However, the preferential selection of graduates of the Academy, a key element in
terms of merit based selection for the judiciary, has been contested. The selection
mechanism was referred to the Serbian Constitutional Court by a group of judges and
prosecutors who objected to the new entry requirements and the requirement for
continual training.10 The Court declared the initial provisions of the Law on Judicial
Academy to be unconstitutional. As a result, graduates of the Academy could no longer
be treated preferentially, nor could new or existing judges or prosecutors be compelled
to undertake the Academy’s trainings. This was a major setback for the Academy in
becoming a fully-ﬂedged national training authority and the source of merit based
appointments for the judiciary as a whole. To use the language of our analytical frame-
work, it represented new rules (being) openly reversed. The cause of the reversal is clearly
bargaining over the shape and scope of the new rules by among formal (the
Constitutional Court) and informal veto players (the group of judges and prosecutors).
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Further investigation suggests that the rules governing the Academy’s place in the
judicial system clash or contradict other sets of existing formal rules Whilst the legal
framework within which the Academy works is more comprehensive and robust than
that which governed the Training Centre, its role and function within the judicial system
is not precise enough for many.11 For example, the 2006 constitution created two
separate bodies (the High Judicial Council and High Prosecutorial Council) for the
recruitment and career management of judges and prosecutors. The relationship
between the Academy and these two bodies is not clearly stipulated and, according
to the European Commission, ‘further legislative and institutional changes are needed. . .’
(European Commission 2013b). Drawing on the language of our framework, this sug-
gests partial compliance. The source of partial compliance appears to be an incompat-
ibility between existing sets of rules, rather than the actions of informal and formal veto
players as in the previous instance discussed above. The meteoric rise of the Academy
and the changes regarding the appointment of judges and prosecutors had an addi-
tional eﬀect of dividing the judicial community (between candidates with experience,
and graduates of the Academy) and, according to its critics, brought additional confu-
sion into a judicial system that lacks public credibility.12
Whilst it might well be that the Constitutional Court ruling is evidence of new rules
(being) openly reversed in an attempt by those associated with the prosecution to keep
control over entry into the profession, concerns about the divisiveness of the new
institution are legitimate. Full institutionalisation, based on our conceptualisation, occurs
when informal rules fully aligning with formal rules, and new institutions (become) para-
mount and able to realise their designated jurisdiction and authority. If there exists
a duplication of rules, this creates institutions with contested authority, and full institu-
tionalisation cannot be said to have taken place.
Despite the Constitutional Court ruling, the EU has remained steadfast in its support
for the Academy. Indeed, the 2016 progress report reiterates that whilst ensuring
compliance with the ruling ‘(f)urther reform of the Academy is needed to improve its
professional, ﬁnancial and administrative capacity so it can become a proper indepen-
dent and compulsory point of entry to the judicial profession’ (European Commission
2016b, 14). The Commission’s statement resonates with concerns raised by the (non-
governmental) Association of Prosecutors, which argues that the Academy remains
a weak institution lacking suﬃcient independence and being subject to undue political
interference.13 It is argued by those supporting voices in the profession that if the
Academy is to properly drive up standards and increase the eﬃciency and profession-
alism of the judiciary, further reforms are needed to bolster its power vis-à-vis the
executive, to increase its capacity as a training and professional standards body, and
also to better integrate it within the judicial system (in particular, to foster closer link
with the High Judicial Council).14 This would also strengthen the prospect of full
institutionalisation whereby new rules align with practice.
Whether the Judicial Academy is suﬃciently independent or not, other political actors
continue trying to inﬂuence its processes and composition. Of particular concern is the
fact that the Ministry of Justice currently wields considerable inﬂuence over the compo-
sition of the Academy: three out of nine members of the Managing Board are appointed
directly by the government, including one oﬃcial from the Ministry of Justice; the
Ministry is also responsible for monitoring the Academy’s overall performance. Thus,
228 A. FAGAN AND A. DIMITROVA
representatives of the executive exercise more than just oversight. They are in fact
involved in the management of the Judicial Academy, with potentially negative con-
sequences for the independence of individuals entering the profession. The Serbian
Anti-Corruption-Council, a governmental advisory body established in 2001, commen-
ted: ‘this way of selecting new attendees of the Judicial Academy is a model by which
the executive power acquires the possibility to participate in the selection of new judges
and prosecutors through the Judicial Academy’ (Anti-Corruption Council 2014, 10).
Concluding this overview of the introduction of one element supporting judicial
professionalism and independence, we note that there is a widely-held consensus
amongst key stakeholders that an acceptable balance between independence, account-
ability and professional competence has yet to be struck in Serbia.15 The limited and
contested eﬃcacy of the Academy compounds a judicial system that is slated for the
persistence of politically appointed judges, for poor quality prosecutors in basic courts,
and for the lack of expertise on issues relating to EU and other international legislation.16
For critics, EU assistance and support has transformed the existing Training Centre,
which had been established by domestic practitioners and operated independently of
political interference from the executive and legislature, into an Academy that (formally)
allows signiﬁcant involvement of the Ministry of Justice in the training of judges and
prosecutors, and enables three out of nine members of the Managing Board of the
Academy to be appointed directly by the government (National Assembly of the
Republic of Serbia 2009). Of greater concern is that the new body, implemented with
the support and backing of the EU, has in practice limited authority to control entry and
exit to the profession and drive forth raised standards via comprehensive training. Thus,
rather than the new rules aligning with practice, there is clear evidence of those new rules
being partially reversed.
Building judicial independence in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Supporting the dual projects of peace-building and institution-building in ethno-
territorially fragmented BiH represents the most ambitious initiative by the EU in the
Stabilisation and Association process spanning the Western Balkans. As a result of the
post-conﬂict settlements after the wars in the 1990s, central state functions are generally
weak, and most substantive political power rests with the two sub-state entities: the
Federation of BiH (FBiH) with a Bosniak majority and Croat minority; and the Serb-
dominated Republika Srpska (RS). In FBiH, there are also ten cantons (most with
recognised ethnic majorities), which compounds the problems of administrative and
political fragmentation. Brčko District is disputed by RS and FBiH, and is governed as
a condominium between the two entities with an international administration.
This complex constitutional conﬁguration has allowed ethnic elites to exert
unchecked authority in all aspects of political, economic, judicial and social life. The
international community has provided substantial ﬁnancial and technical assistance for
nearly two decades, ﬁrst under the auspices of the Dayton-Paris Agreement at the end of
the wars, and then the Stabilisation and Association process from 2000. This evolution of
external incentives and change of key actors involved has been described as a pathway
from ‘Dayton’ to ‘Brussels’ as the driver of change (Aybet and Bieber 2011).
Notwithstanding the claims that external interventions are tantamount to a ‘European
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Raj’ (Knaus and Martin 2003), international assistance, particularly from the EU, has been
pivotal in reforming judicial institutions across the country.
BiH has long been viewed as a laggard in terms of EU accession, and has
experienced huge diﬃculties and lengthy delays in negotiating an SAA
(Stabilization and Association Agreement). In terms of reforming the rule of law,
the peculiar constitutional conﬁguration of the country institutionalises fragmenta-
tion of the judiciary and prevents the pursuit of common standards and practices
(Kadribašić 2014). The challenge is to ensure that the country’s citizens are treated
equally regardless of the entity or canton in which they reside, but also to prevent
a multitude of political actors from interfering within a constitutional architecture
that potentially provides a plethora of opportunities to do so.
The high judicial and prosecutorial council (HJPC) of BiH
The state-level HJPC of BiH was established through a voluntary Transfer of Certain Entities’
Responsibilities Agreement signed by the Prime Ministers of the Federation and RS and the
Minister for Justice of BiH in 2004. The HJPC is not identiﬁed within the constitution, but
justiﬁes its existence through constitutional principles and owes its existence to pressure
from the international community to ensure state-wide powers and a harmonization of
standards and competences (Venice Commission 2014, 3). Its existence as a state-wide body
created ‘to consolidate and strengthen the independence of the judiciary’ is immediately
salient and, of course, highly controversial in such a fragmented political and constitutional
system (Kmezić 2017, 68). Indeed, the full institutionalisation of the HJPC – understood here
as old rules fully aligning with new rules, and the new institution being able to realise its
designated jurisdiction and authority – would symbolise progress towards Europeanization,
de-ethniﬁcation, and political and constitutional change.
Notwithstanding certain teething problems in its ﬁrst year, most judges and experts
interviewed for this research were positive about the HJPC and credited it with having
improved performance and independence of the judiciary.17 It is widely seen as the
most successful institutional innovation for transposition of EU standards in the area of
rule of law (Kmezić 2017, 69). Indeed, in its most recent progress report, the Commission
describes the HJPC as ‘the key institution managing the judiciary throughout the
country’ (European Commission 2016a, 14).
As noted above, the HJPC is one of the very few independent state-level bodies in
existence.18 It has wide-ranging competences across courts and prosecutors’ oﬃces
across all levels of governance in BiH, including: appointment and promotion of all
judges and prosecutors in BiH; receiving complaints and conducting disciplinary pro-
ceedings; determining training; and proposing judicial budgets.19 The current composi-
tion of 15 members of the HJPC comprises judges and prosecutors from the state, entity,
and district levels appointed by members of the respective courts and prosecutor’s
oﬃces. The only indirect inﬂuence exerted by the other branches of authority is through
the selection of the two non-judicial/non-political members of the HJPC by the
Parliamentary Assembly of BiH and Council of Ministers of BiH, respectively.20
In its 2012 assessment of judicial independence in BiH, the Venice Commission
concluded: ‘the establishment of the HJPC and its performance over the eight years of
its existence have been assessed positively by representatives of the judiciary in BiH. The
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HJPC ha(s) helped increase the institutional and individual independence of the judi-
ciary’ (Venice Commission 2012). A recent TAIEX21 seminar concluded that the HJPC has
been given greater competences than similar bodies in EU member states and other
parts of the Western Balkans, and is seen to be completely independent of executive
and legislative control (European Commission Services 2015, 8).
Perhaps due to its perceived independence, the HJPC has been frequently targeted
publicly by political leaders, mainly but not exclusively from Republika Srpska. In late
2012, leaders from both the SNSD (the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats – RS)
and the SDP (Social Democratic Party – FBIH) signed an agreement that proposed to
make the appointment of chief prosecutors a decision of the legislature. Although this
was justiﬁed as a necessary measure to ensure greater checks on judicial power, the
change would have weakened the independence of the HJPC and opened the door to
more political interference. The agreement was immediately criticised by the President
of the HJPC, the Venice Commission (in its 2012 Opinion), and EU oﬃcials and no change
was made to the process for appointing chief prosecutors (Tausan and Dzidic 2012). To
use the language of our analytical framework, despite an overt attempt to reverse the
new rules, this was averted and the HJPC’s authority and power was maintained.
Despite the positive assessments of the HJPC and its apparent ability to forestall overt
attempts to diminish its powers and authority by political elites, concerns have been
raised about two aspects of its work: the eﬀects of its independence, and the merito-
cratic appointment and promotion of judges and prosecutors. Regarding independence,
the allegation is that ethnic interests or factions within the Council have begun to
impede its work.22 This is diﬃcult to corroborate due to the fact that the HJPC works
entirely behind closed doors, but concerns have been raised that members of the HJPC
are bringing their ethno-political agenda into the proceedings.23 With regard to merito-
cratic appointment, the concern is that due to the requirement for constituent peoples
to be represented within the selection process, the qualiﬁcations of judges and prose-
cutors are not always paramount criteria (Kmezić 2017, 70).
To its critics, the HJPC has been eﬀective in guarding its authority, but less prudent in
limiting contact with political actors or bodies, and is not using its independence to
promote a judiciary free of political inﬂuence.24 The internal workings of the Council –
how various factions are balanced and managed – are as critical to ensuring indepen-
dence as the prevention of (direct) interference from the executive, legislature or other
political interests. In other words, greater independence does not necessarily equal fairer
and more equitable decisions. Independent bodies, as the comparative literature sug-
gests, can be as conservative or subjective as judicial bodies that are heavily inﬂuenced
by political elites (Garoupa and Ginsburg 2008).
Following discussions in the Structured Dialogue on Justice between the EU and
BiH,25 the HJPC adopted a rulebook on conﬂict of interest in May 2014, seen as a ﬁrst
step towards an ethical code for the Bosnian judiciary. However, soon after its
adoption, some members of the HJPC suggested amending the rulebook, an amend-
ment which would water down the provisions, which the Commission felt would
result in ‘a vacuum on questionable practices of conﬂict between private and public
interest of its members’. Furthermore, in November 2014, the HJPC discussed revok-
ing the rulebook altogether (European Commission Services 2015, 2). The provision
that caused particular consternation was the stipulation that members of the HJPC
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would have to resign if their parents, children, adoptive parents, adopted children,
spouse, or common law partner applied for any post in the judiciary.26 In response to
the HJPC attempts to amend the rulebook, the EU organised a TAIEX seminar on
‘Conﬂict of Interest in the Judiciary’ at the EU Delegation in Sarajevo in
February 2015. The EU and member state representatives stressed that in return for
the ‘unprecedented’ level of HJPC independence, necessary in the highly politicised
Bosnian context, it was vital to maintain ‘clear and stringent’ measures related to
conﬂict of interest (European Commission Services 2015, 8). The HJPC conceded and
withdrew the proposal to amend the code of practice.
The EU intervened quickly and decisively as it believed the functioning of
a judicial institution it has supported was threatened, but also because it was
concerned that the new institution was not performing in accordance with its
remit. As an oﬃcial at EUSR observed, there was a sense that with the high levels
of independence enjoyed by the HJPC, its members were ‘out of control’ and felt
‘untouchable’, and there was the danger that the HJPC would slide towards ‘judicial
oligarchy’ as in Croatia.27 The same oﬃcial also noted that the issue was not about
ensuring greater control or accountability for the executive or legislature, but ‘ensur-
ing mechanisms for regulating the HJPC’.
In its 2014 progress report, the Commission noted that ‘a lack of adequate
disciplinary sanctions against wrongdoing judicial oﬃce holders’ (European
Commission 2014b, 13). The responsible institution, the Disciplinary Prosecutor, has
received extensive support from the EU, but its institutional location within the HJPC
has undermined its eﬀectiveness and conjured a sense that it is not properly
independent. EU and other international oﬃcials recognise that the Disciplinary
Prosecutor ‘should not have to report to the members of the HJPC on his/her
colleagues (i.e. other members of the HJPC)’.28 For example, an EUSR oﬃcial cited
the case of a judge who had not cast a verdict in a number of years, leading to the
statute of limitation expiring in a number of cases. The Disciplinary Prosecutor
recommended removal, but the HJPC, which has the ﬁnal say, overturned the
recommendation.29 The problem is that ‘everybody knows everyone here. So they
tend to be protective. . . there are no sanctions. . . They never fully dismiss you, you
are guaranteed your pension, so nobody is afraid of doing anything that is unethical
or unprofessional, because there are no repercussions’.30 Thus, the HJPC is able to
continue in this way because of the lack of transparency and a ‘very high level of
independence’.31 In its most recent progress report, the EU’s concerns about the
balance between accountability and power of the HJPC are clearly stated: ‘The
constitutional and legal framework needs to ensure full protection against unlawful
pressure on the independence, impartiality and autonomy of judges and prosecutors.
There is a need to broaden the grounds for appeal against ﬁnal HJPC decisions
including those on appointments of judges and prosecutors and their transfers as
well as in disciplinary proceedings’.
In terms of our analytical framework for investigating how new rules fare after
formal implementation, the case of the HJPC illustrates the resilience of EU-backed
rules in the face of attempts to subvert and nullify. Critically, the case study shows
that attempts to subvert can occur from within the new organizational framework,
and the process of institutionalising a new body may involve repeated interventions
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(from the EU and other external actors) to continually ensure that new rules align
with other rules and are not reversed. Given that the preference of some domestic
actors was for subverting or reversing the new rules, the EU intervention should be
understood as the external actors participating in the domestic bargaining over the
shape of the new rules. It is worth noting that such repeated interventions may only
be possible when both the formal role and the power of external actors vis-à-vis
domestic actors are signiﬁcant.
Conclusion
Our objective has been to extend understanding of the conditions under which
already initiated reforms based on externally imported rules lead to sustainable
change in domestic institutions, or alternatively fail to become institutionalised and
therefore have limited or no impact. Drawing on existing theoretical studies, our
analytical framework identiﬁed ﬁve possible pathways for the interaction between
formal and informa rules post adoption: (i) full alignment; (ii) new rules are ignored;
(iii) new rules are openly reversed; (iv) new rules are subverted; and (v) partial
compliance with new rules.
In both case-studies, new formal rules promoted by the EU are in place. The
Venice Commission and the EU agree that notwithstanding certain deﬁciencies and
shortcomings, both Serbia’s Academy and BiH’s High Council have made a positive
contribution to judicial recruitment and training. However, our data suggest that full
institutionalization has not occurred in either case. Indeed, we found evidence of
attempted subversion and reversal, involving a new round of competition about the
form of the new rules. Analysing the stages of rule development in both institutional
settings, we attribute such lack of institutionalization not simply to rejection or
reversal, but to partial subversion and partial institutionalization. This halfway state
is the result of at least two sets of factors: ﬁrst, the interventions and bargaining of
domestic actors that ﬁnd themselves constrained by the new rules, and second, lack
of ﬁt with other existing formal and informal rules. In the case of Serbia, other formal
rules create diﬀerent frameworks for judicial recruitment and undermine institutio-
nalization. In the case of BiH, there is a continuing discrepancy between formal and
informal rules, leaving the new rules subject to being contested and defended but
not yet institutionalized in terms of changing the behaviour of the members of the
High Council.
Beyond our country speciﬁc conclusions, it is also possible to identify the broader
implications of these cases for future research. Regarding the transformative power
of the EU, our ﬁndings endorse the assertion that institutionalisation after formal
implementation is particularly complex. We illustrate not just the ease with which
subversion and reversal can occur, and the vulnerability of new rules to ‘legacies of
deep conditions’ (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig 2010, 431), but the extent to which
the success of even an apparently successful reform is contingent upon a continual
process of bargaining among veto players and prone to interventions by external
and internal stakeholders competing to inﬂuence the shape of the new rules.
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Notes
1. Under the new approach chapters dealing with rule of law and fundamental rights are not
only prioritised at the start of accession negotiations, but also remain open throughout the
negotiation process (European Commission 2011, 5).
2. Whilst both the judicial academy and the HJPC have been the focus of conditionality and
the target of assistance and training initiatives, it is important to note that at no point has
the EU insisted or directly requested that Serbia or BiH create such bodies.
3. Interview with JAS, Belgrade, 26 February 2015.
4. The EU’s IPA 2012 programme contained a ﬁche entitled ‘Support to the Rule of Law
System’, which included activities related to building curricula at the Judicial Academy.
5. Interview with Judges’ Association (JAS), Belgrade, 26 February 2015.
6. (Venice Commission 2014, 8–9).
7. Interview with Yucom, Skopje, 27 August 2014.
8. For details, see: http://www.vk.sud.rs/sr-lat/o-pravosudnoj-akademiji. Also, interview with
JAS, 26 February 2015.
9. Interviews with the Judicial Academy, Belgrade, 2 March 2017.
10. Interview with Association of Prosecutors, Belgrade, 24 February 2015.
11. Interviews with: Centre for Human Rights, Belgrade, 24 February 2015.
12. Interview with Association of Prosecutors, Belgrade, 24 February 2015.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Interviews with: Centre for Human Rights, Belgrade, 24 February 2015; Judicial Academy,
Belgrade, 23 February 2015; JAS, Belgrade, 26 February 2015; SEIO, Belgrade,
24 February 2015; Association of Prosecutors, Belgrade, 23 February 2015; Ministry of
Justice, Belgrade, 26 February 2015; and the EU delegation oﬃce, Belgrade,
27 February 2015.
16. Interviews with: the Judicial Academy, Belgrade, 23 February 2015; JAS, Belgrade,
26 February 2015; SEIO, Belgrade, 24 February 2015; Association of Prosecutors, Belgrade,
23 February 2015; BIRODI, Belgrade, 27 February 2015; and the Centre for Human Rights,
24 February 2015.
17. Interviews with 4 judges (conducted in May / June 2014).
18. Law on HJPC, Consolidated text, art. 1. The HJPC provided a copy of this document.
19. Law on HJPC, art. 17.
20. Law on HJPC, art. 4.
21. TAIEX: Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument of the European
Commission. See: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/tenders/taiex_en.
22. Interview with an international oﬃcial working in Sarajevo, 20 February 2015.
23. Ibid.
24. Indeed, politicians from across the political divide have suggested an increase in the
executive and legislative inﬂuence in appointing HJPC members.
25. “The Structured Dialogue on Justice is a mechanism of the European Commission to
advance structured relations on the rule of law with potential candidate countries. The
Structured Dialogue assists Bosnia and Herzegovina to consolidate an independent, eﬀec-
tive, eﬃcient and professional judicial system. The ﬁrst meeting of the EU-BiH Structured
Dialogue on Justice was held on 6 and 7 June 2011. See: http://europa.ba/?page_id=553.
26. Book of Rules on Conﬂicts of Interest for Members of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial
Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, adopted 29 May 2014, art. 2–4. Copy provided by the HJPC.
27. Interview with an EUSR oﬃcial, 9 February 2015.
28. Interview with an international oﬃcial working in Sarajevo, 20 February 2015.
29. Interview with an EUSR oﬃcial, 9 February 2015.
30. Interview with an international oﬃcial working in Sarajevo, 20 February 2015.
31. Interview with an EUSR oﬃcial, 9 February 2015.
234 A. FAGAN AND A. DIMITROVA
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This work was supported by the EU Commission [FP7 Maxcap Project].
ORCID
Adam Fagan http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1033-4675
Antoaneta Dimitrova http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1565-8254
References
Anti-Corruption Council. 2014. Report on Judicial Reform. «http://www.antikorupcija-savet.gov.rs/
Storage/Global/Documents/izvestaji/report%20second.doc»
Aybet, G., and F. Bieber. 2011. “From Dayton to Brussels: The Impact Of Eu and Nato Conditionality
on State Building in Bosnia & Hercegovina.” Europe-asia Studies 63 (10): 1911–1937. doi:10.1080/
09668136.2011.618706.
Bobek, M., and D. Kosaš. 2014. “Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial
Councils in Central and Eastern Europe.” German Law Journal 15: 1257.
Börzel, T. A. 2015. “The Noble West and the Dirty Rest? Western Democracy Promoters and Illiberal
Regional Powers.” Democratization 22 (3): 519–535. doi:10.1080/13510347.2014.1000312.
Börzel, T. A., and V. Hüllen. 2014. “State Building and the European Union’s Fight against
Corruption in the Southern Caucasus: Why Legitimacy Matters.” Governance 27 (4): 613–634.
doi:10.1111/gove.2014.27.issue-4.
Cirtautas, A. M., and F. Schimmelfennig. 2010. “Europeanisation before and after Accession:
Conditionality, Legacies and Compliance.” Europe-Asia Studies 62 (3): 421–441. doi:10.1080/
09668131003647812.
Dimitrova, A. L. 2010. “The New Member States of the EU in the Aftermath of Enlargement: Do
New European Rules Remain Empty Shells?” Journal of European Public Policy 17 (1): 137–148.
doi:10.1080/13501760903464929.
Elbasani, A., and S. Š. Šabić. 2018. “Rule of Law, Corruption and Democratic Accountability in the
Course of EU Enlargement.” Journal of European Public Policy 25 (9): 1317–1335. doi:10.1080/
13501763.2017.1315162.
European Commission. 2011. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011–2012. [COM(2011)
666 ﬁnal]. «https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/ﬁles/pdf/key_docu
ments/2011/package/strategy_paper_2011_en.pdf»
European Commission. 2013b. Serbia 2013 Progress Report. [SWD(2013) 412 ﬁnal]. «https://ec.
europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/ﬁles/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/bro
chures/serbia_2013.pdf»
European Commission. 2014b. Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014 Progress Report. «https://ec.europa.eu/
neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/ﬁles/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-bosnia-and-
herzegovina-progress-report_en.pdf»
European Commission. 2016a Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016 Report SWD(2016) 365 ﬁnal. «https://ec.
europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/ﬁles/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_
report_bosnia_and_herzegovina.pdf»
European Commission. 2016b. Serbia 2016 Report SWD(2016) 361 ﬁnal. «https://ec.europa.eu/
neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/ﬁles/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_ser
bia.pdf»
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 235
European Commission Services. 2015. Summary Conclusions of the TAIEX seminar on ‘Conﬂict of
Interest in the Judiciary’. Accessed 4–5 February 2015. «http://europa.ba/wp-content/uploads/
2015/05/delegacijaEU_2015022712334835eng.pdf»
Fagan, A. 2010. “The New Kids on the Block – Building Environmental Governance in the Western
Balkans.” Acta Politica 45: 203. doi:10.1057/ap.2009.19.
Freyburg, T., and S. Richter. 2010. “National Identity Matters: The Limited Impact of EU Political
Conditionality in the Western Balkans.” Journal of European Public Policy 17 (2): 262–280.
doi:10.1080/13501760903561450.
Garoupa, N. M., and T. Ginsburg. 2008. “"Judicial audiences and reputation: Perspectives from
comparative law." Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 47: 451.
Ginsburg, T., 2010. Judicial Independence in East Asia: Implications for China.
Hayo, B., and S. Voigt. 2007. “Explaining De Facto Judicial Independence.” International Review of
Law and Economics 27: 269–290. doi:10.1016/j.irle.2007.07.004.
Herron, E.S., and K.A. Randazzo. 2003. “The Relationship between Independence and Judicial
Review in Post-communist Courts.” The Journal of Politics 65 (2): 422–438. doi:10.1111/1468-
2508.t01-3-00007.
Kadribašić, A. 2014. “Democratic Transition, Rule of Law and Europeanization: Limited Progress in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.” In Europeanization by Rule of Law Implementation in the Western
Balkans, edited by M. Kmezić, 63–90. Skopje: Institute for Democracy SOCIETAS CIVILIS.
Keith, L. C. 2002. “Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1977–1996): Are They
More than Mere “Window Dressing?” Political Research Quarterly 55 (1): 111–143.
Kmezić, M. 2017. EU Rule of Law Promotion: Judiciary Reform in the Western Balkans. Abingdon and
New York: Routledge.
Knaus, G., and F. Martin. 2003. “Travails of the European Raj.” Journal of Democracy 14 (3): 60–74.
doi:10.1353/jod.2003.0053.
Lauth, H. J. 2012. “Informal Governance and Democratic Theory.” In International Handbook on
Informal Governance, edited by T. Christiansen and C. Neuhold, 40–64. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar.
Melton, J., and T. Ginsburg. 2014. “Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter?:
A Reevaluation of Explanations for Judicial Independence.” Journal of Law and Courts 2 (2):
187–217. doi:10.1086/676999.
Mendelski, M. 2012. “EU-driven Judicial Reforms in Romania: A Success Story?” East European
Politics 28 (1): 23–42. doi:10.1080/13523279.2011.636806.
Mendelski, M. 2013. “They Have Failed Again! Donor-Driven Promotion of the Rule of Law in
Serbia.” Südosteuropa 61 (1): 79–113.
Meyer-Sahling, J. H. 2011. “The Durability of EU Civil Service Policy in Central and Eastern Europe
after Accession.” Governance 24 (2): 231–260. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2011.01523.x.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 2014. “The Transformative Power of Europe Revisited.” Journal of Democracy 25
(1): 20–32. doi:10.1353/jod.2014.0003.
National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. 2009. “Law on the Judicial Academy.” «http://www.
seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/ekspertske%20misije/Judicial%20Reform/judicial%20academy/
Law%20on%20Judicial%20Academ%2009.pdf»
North, D. C., J. J. Wallis, and B. R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual
Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Noutcheva, G. 2009. “Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: The Limits of the EU’s Normative
Power in the Western Balkans.” Journal of European Public Policy 16 (7): 1065–1084. doi:10.1080/
13501760903226872.
Parau, C. E. 2012. “The Drive for Judicial Supremacy.” In Judicial Independence in Transition, edited
by A. Seibert-Fohr, 619–667. Heidelberg: Springer.
Parau, C. E. 2015. “Explaining Governance of the Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe: External
Incentives, Transnational Elites and Parliamentary Inaction.” Europe-Asia Studies 67 (3): 409–442.
doi:10.1080/09668136.2015.1016401.
236 A. FAGAN AND A. DIMITROVA
Preshova, D., I. Damjanovski, and Z. Nechev 2017. “The Eﬀectiveness of the ‘European Model’ of
Judicial Independence in the Western Balkans: Judicial Councils as a Solution or a New Cause of
Concern for Judicial Reforms (2017).” CLEER Paper Series, 2017/1, T.M.C. Asser Institute for
International & European Law 2017-1. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3118942
Schimmelfennig, F., and U. Sedelmeier. 2005. “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to
the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” In The Europeanization of Central and
Eastern Europe, edited by F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, 1–28. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Schimmelfennig, F. 2014. “European Integration in The Euro Crisis: The Limits Of
Postfunctionalism.” Journal of European Integration 36 (3): 321–337. doi:10.1080/
07036337.2014.886399.
Smithey, S. I., and J. Ishiyama. 2002. “Judicial Activism in Post-Communist Politics.” Law and Society
Review 36 (4): 719–742. doi:10.2307/1512169.
Steunenberg, B., and A. L. Dimitrova. 2007. “Compliance in the EU Enlargement Process: The Limits
of Conditionality.” European Integration Online Papers 11.
Strelkov, A. 2016. “The Eu and Rule Of Law Promotion in Western Balkans–a New Role for
Candidate States’ Parliaments.” East European Politics 32 (4): 505–524. doi:10.1080/
21599165.2016.1228529.
Tausan, M., and D. Dzidic 2012. “Bosnian Political Deal Draws Criticism from Judiciary.” Balkan
Insight, November 2. «http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-political-deal-draws-
criticism-from-judiciary»
Venice Commission. 2012. “Opinion on Legal Certainty and the Independence of the Judiciary in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.” [CDL-AD(2012)014]. «http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/docu
ments/default.aspx?pdﬃle=CDL-AD(2012)014-e»
Venice Commission. 2014. “Opinion on the Draft Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial
Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” [CDL-AD(2014)008]. «http://www.venice.coe.int/web
forms/documents/default.aspx?pdﬃle=CDL-AD(2014)008-e»
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 237
